U.S. Ethanol Policy:  The Unintended Consequences by Griffin, James M. & Soto, Maricio Cifuentes
U.S. Ethanol Policy:  
 
The Unintended  
Consequences 
 
JAMES M. GRIFFIN AND MAURICIO CIFUENTES SOTO 
The Mosbacher Institute 
VOLUME 3 | ISSUE 1 | 2012 
2012 
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) mandated a 
steep rise in domestic ethanol production. The goals were to ease 
dependency on imported petroleum and to cut greenhouse gas emissions. 
A new blend of ethanol and conventional gasoline was to cost motorists 
less. EISA mandated ethanol production to grow from 4.9 billion gallons 
in 2006, to 36 billion by 2022. Today, at 14 billion gallons, we’re not even 
halfway there. EISA envisioned that cellulosic ethanol would provide the 
future growth, but reasonable production costs remain elusive. The 
unintended consequences of the policy, especially those influencing world 
food prices, are negative and far outweigh the positives. 
GOOD INTENTIONS 
Initially, lawmakers envisioned 
that by jumpstarting a U.S. biofu-
els industry, four intended conse-
quences would result: 1) the 
American motorist would see low-
er prices at the pump; 2) while 
taxpayers would forego tax reve-
nue, lower pump prices would 
more than compensate; 3) the U.S. 
would build energy security as 
domestic ethanol replaced oil im-
ports from the Middle East; and 
4) since corn plants absorb CO2 
from the atmosphere, greenhouse 
gas emissions would fall signifi-
cantly.  
 
There was little or no discussion 
of unintended consequences for 
food prices. After all, trends in 
food prices had been flat for sev-
eral decades. 
 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Corn-based ethanol has  had 
only small price, energy security, 
and environmental benefits  
 
Yet, the unintended 
consequences on food prices 
have been large and negative 
 
Rich consumers can substitute 
away from higher-priced foods, 
but the world’s poor have no 
such options 
 
Repealing EISA would bring food 
prices down, while keeping 
market incentives for ethanol 
use intact 
2 DID THE BENEFITS MATERIALIZE?  
Cheaper gas? First, from the consumer’s perspec-
tive, the current blend of E10 (or 10% ethanol) 
gasoline offers pros and cons. The btu efficiency 
of a gallon of ethanol is about 40% less than a 
gallon of conventional gasoline. So, an E10 blend 
requires 4% more fuel than conventional gaso-
line, costing the consumer an extra 13 cents per 
gallon. On the positive side, the refining costs of 
making E10 and the costs of crude oil are lower 
with ethanol. On balance, these effects do out-
weigh the lower efficiency of E10, so that the 
motorist saves about 6.5 cents per gallon with 
E10 (Griffin).  
 
Revenue-neutral? Second, most Americans are 
not aware that ethanol blenders receive a 45 
cent per gallon federal subsidy. For a gallon of 
E10, Uncle Sam pays 4.5 cents per gallon. On net, 
the motorist/taxpayer is only slightly better off 
by 2 cents a gallon, or about $3 billion per year. 
 
Better energy security? Superficially, this benefit 
looks large. Comparing June 2011 ethanol pro-
duction of 910,000 barrels per day against total 
petroleum imports of 11.8 million barrels per 
day, it is tempting to conclude that our ethanol 
policy has boosted our energy security by 7.7%. 
But this conclusion is wrong, for several reasons. 
Because of its lower btu efficiency, ethanol only 
displaces 655,000 barrels, or 5.6% of imported 
petroleum. Further, the percentage of import 
dependency is a misleading indicator of security. 
The world oil market is global, as are its market 
effects. Even though the U.S. imports no oil from 
Iran, for example, a disruption of Iranian sup-
plies would trigger world-wide increases in all 
oil prices—even domestic oil prices.  
 
Ethanol is a clumsy tool for promoting oil securi-
ty. During a supply disruption, we need a source 
that can be turned on for the period of the dis-
ruption. Ethanol clearly doesn’t meet this criteri-
on; production cannot be ramped up on short 
notice. Through the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, 
the U.S. already has a formidable source of oil 
that can be quickly pumped from the massive 
salt domes along the Gulf Coast and processed in 
nearby refineries.    
 
Eco-friendly? Finally, ethanol was anticipated to 
slash greenhouse gas emissions. Since in growing 
corn, it absorbs CO2 from the atmosphere and 
then releases it when consumed as ethanol, one 
may think that ethanol is environmentally neu-
tral. But a life-cycle analysis that includes the 
CO2 emissions in plowing, planting, applying 
fertilizer, harvesting the corn and delivering it to 
the ethanol plant, producing the ethanol, and 
distributing it tells another story. A 2008 study 
by the Argonne National Laboratory estimates 
that the life-cycle CO2 emissions to produce one 
gallon of conventional gasoline emits 12.5 kilo-
grams, whereas the life-cycle emissions of btu-
equivalent ethanol emits 10 kilograms—a 20% 
reduction. Since in 2011, ethanol displaced 
655,000 barrels per day of gasoline, the CO2 
emissions saved amounted to 25.2 million metric 
tons annually. Compared to total U.S. and world 
emissions, the effects are miniscule—0.42% of 
U.S. and 0.08% of world emissions.  
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:  
RISING WORLD FOOD PRICES   
While the intended outcomes have been small 
but positive, the unintended consequences on 
food prices have been the polar opposite. Disen-
tangling the effects of ethanol mandates from 
rising oil prices, fertilizer costs, Chinese soybean 
imports, etc., is not trivial. Figure 1 offers some 
clues. From 2000 through 2005, corn production 
destined for ethanol production grew as ethanol 
displaced MTBE as an oxygenate for gasoline. 
Meanwhile, the price of corn fluctuated between 
$2 and $2.50 per bushel, and corn production 
destined for food purposes was stable. Even up 
until 2007, rising overall production allowed 
corn for ethanol purposes to grow without dis-
placing its use for food. But after 2007, the EISA’s 
ethanol mandates drove up ethanol production 
at the expense of food uses. From 2007 to 2011 
corn used for food purposes (including seed and 
other non-ethanol uses) fell by almost 3 billion 
bushels. By 2011, 37% of the corn crop went 
towards ethanol production, and corn prices 
stood at a lofty $7.50 per bushel. 
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Ethanol is a clumsy tool 
for promoting oil security 
Eco-friendly by 8 
hundreths of 1 percent? 
Corn is not a minor, isolated part of U.S. or world 
agriculture. The U.S. is the largest producer of 
corn and its exports account for 53% of world 
corn exports. The meteoric rise of corn prices 
caused farmers to increase corn acreage at the 
expense of other grain products. Out of a total U.S. 
farm acreage of 305 million acres harvested, corn 
acreage grew from 72.4 million acres in 2000 to 
84 million acres in 2011. With total harvested 
acreage showing little change, the growth in corn 
acreage has meant smaller plantings of other 
grains like soybeans, wheat, and rice. With the 
U.S. being a major exporter of these other grains, 
their world prices have more than doubled be-
tween 2007 and 2011.  
 
With all grain prices rising sharply, it was only a 
matter of time before broad indexes of world food 
prices would be affected (Figure 2). Between Jan-
uary 2007 and September 2011, the U.N.’s aggre-
gate index of food prices (FAO Food Price Index), 
after adjusting for inflation, increased by 68%, 
cereals by 69% and dairy products by 46%. Meat 
prices have risen more slowly, but future increas-
es are likely.  
 
These simple facts tell a persuasive causal story 
that runs from ethanol mandates to corn prices, 
then to production and prices of other grains, and 
finally to prices of retail food products. One study 
(Hayes et al, 2009) quantifies how a $1 per bushel 
increase in corn prices impacts a wide variety of 
food products. For example, between 2005 and 
2011, corn prices rose by $5 per bushel, implying 
these price increases: beef (18.5%), pork (16%), 
poultry (17.5%), eggs (27.5%), milk (10.5%), 
cheese (9%), sugar and sweets (3.5%).  
 
That being said, U.S. ethanol policy is not the sole 
culprit behind the world food price increase. Even 
though the timing of the higher prices coincides 
with the 2007 ethanol mandates, Abbott et al 
point to soybean exports to China and the E.U.’s 
own biofuels policies as the main co-contributors 
to the big jumps in grain prices. Since 2005, U.S. 
soybean exports to China have doubled, driven by 
greater demand for grains to feed livestock as 
meat consumption rises. Meanwhile, the Europe-
an Union’s biofuels mandates grew the percent-
age of transportation fuels containing biofuels 
from 0.2% in 2001 and are mandated to reach a 
10% minimum target by 2020. Substantial acre-
age in Europe and Brazil has already been divert-
ed to these non-food uses.  
 
EFFECTS AT HOME AND ABROAD 
Americans spend on average 11.4% of their dis-
posable income on food (USDA 2010a). When 
food prices rise, we can find ways to spend less: 
by substituting into cheaper or less processed 
products, eating out less, or eating less meat and 
more vegetables. Because of these options, the 
aggregate U.S. consumer price index for food in-
creased by only 16.2% from January 2007 to Oc-
tober 2011 (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Even so, 
this increase implies an additional annual ex-
penditure of $160 billion. Even if only a quarter of 
the additional expenditure is due to our ethanol 
policies, there is an annual loss to American con-
sumers of $40 billion.  
 
This is not a negligible loss, but around the world 
higher food price increases have been truly dev-
astating. The IMF reports a 40% increase in its 
world food price index, and the U.N. reports a 
46% increase over the period 2007 to 2011. In 
many developing countries like Kenya, Pakistan 
and Cameroon, food expenditures absorb at least 
40% or more of the average citizen’s income. 
When cereal grain prices jump by 67.4% as they 
did over the last year, the poor must simply con-
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Figure 2: Monthly Inflation-Adjusted  
FAO World Food Price Indices 
Figure 1: U.S. Corn Uses and Price History 
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sume less; there are no cheaper foods to substitute 
towards. Citing World Bank data, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization reports that rising food 
prices plunged nearly 70 million people into ex-
treme poverty in 2010-2011 (FAO, 2011a).   
 
LET’S END THE EISA MANDATES 
The realized benefits of our ethanol policy have 
been disappointingly small. Motorists/taxpayers 
enjoy a slight benefit of about $3 billion per year. 
Oil security is a complex issue and is better dealt 
with through our Strategic Petroleum Reserve. And 
corn-based ethanol has done little to reduce the 
nation’s carbon footprint. In contrast, the policy’s 
unintended consequences for food prices raise 
grave economic and ethical issues. 
 
Three key policy changes can help: a repeal of the 
ethanol mandates in the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007, an elimination of the ethanol 
subsidy of 45 cents per gallon, and an elimination 
the tariff on cheaper, more eco-friendly Brazilian 
ethanol imports. Congress wisely allowed the sub-
sidies and the tariff to expire on December 31, 
2011. But the most important step—repealing the 
2007 ethanol mandates—remains. A repeal would 
ease pressures on food prices almost immediately. 
Corn prices would fall and the steady diversion of 
other crop land to corn production would halt, 
causing prices of other grains to fall too.   
 
Would these policy changes bankrupt the domestic 
ethanol industry and send corn prices back to their 
2005-2006 levels, causing new hardships for the 
farm sector? A return to 2005-2006 prices seems 
very unlikely. With oil prices at $100 per barrel 
and an existing infrastructure of ethanol plants, 
ethanol will remain a necessary oxygenate and 
attractive additive to conventional gasoline.   
 
Instead of marching blindly ahead to the 2022 
mandated target of 36 billion gallons, let’s reassess 
our ethanol policy. To be sure, we should continue 
to support R&D for advanced biofuels such as cel-
lulosic ethanol. In the interim, we should dismantle 
the ethanol mandates and trust markets to sort out 
the proper mix of ethanol in gasoline.  
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